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Introduction 
The U.S. economy is in the fourth year of a recovery that started in June 2009. The fact that the 
economy is in recovery, even modestly, is something of a miracle given how stacked the deck is against 
it.  
This is absolutely unique in American economic history: 
• There has never been a recovery without the housing market expanding substantially as well. 
• There has never been a recovery with state and local governments shrinking for three years in a 
row. 
• There has never been a recovery with households owing, on average, well more than 100 
percent of their after-tax income in debt. 
Yet even with all three of these dogging us, we have avoided slipping back into recession. 
And that is not all. Exports, which are a key factor contributing to strong growth and have offered a 
boost to many a recovery, have been battling the headwinds of the European financial crisis, slowing 
growth in China and India, and a strengthening dollar, which makes U.S. exports more expensive in the 
world market. And oil prices swung widely during those three years, from June 2009 to June 2012as a 
result of dramatic international events such as the Arab Spring.  
Much of this resilient recovery can be traced to past policy choices President Barack Obama and 
Congress made to specifically focus attention on investments that helped manufacturing and 
commercial construction, on help to struggling states and localities, and on middle-class tax cuts that 
boosted consumption.  Targeted federal policies strengthened the private sector where possible. This 
meant attention to the struggling manufacturing and construction sectors through the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. It meant support for the struggling construction sector through 
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infrastructure investments in the Recovery Act and subsequent legislation. And it meant strengthening 
household after-tax income to reduce household debt burdens more quickly through increased 
unemployment insurance benefits, the Making Work Pay tax credit, added Social Security benefits, and a 
payroll tax holidayall measures targeted toward boosting middle-class incomes, where debt burdens 
were highest.  
The president and Congress once again face a policy choice that could directly impact the strength of the 
U.S. economic recovery. A number of tax cuts are set to expire and federal across-the-board spending 
cuts are scheduled to go into effect at the start of 2013. This so-called fiscal cliff is not a natural 
phenomenon but rather the culmination of past policy decisions that could adversely impact the 
recovery by substantially weakening economic growth.  
There are clear implications from the past few years for the current situation: 
• First, the economy is not strong enough to quickly bring down the unemployment rate due to 
large obstacles, including uncertainty over how policymakers will handle the fiscal cliff. 
• Second, the economic recovery appears rather resilient. It has avoided another recession in 
current years despite severe obstacles. That is, the policy goal is to strengthen the recovery. 
• Third, public policy has strengthened the economic recovery sufficiently to avoid another 
recession. Policymakers have shown a willingness and ability to work together at key moments 
to focus on avoiding an economic downturn. 
• Fourth, past policies have worked because they targeted key weaknesses in the U.S. economy, 
such as a struggling manufacturing and a decimated construction sector, high household debt 
burdens, and decreasing state and local government finances. The implication is that policies 
now need to address the remaining weaknesses to efficiently strengthen the economic recovery 
in the face of large federal budget deficits.  
There are a few things we can infer from past experiencefrom the economic data and from public 
opinion surveys on what will happen to the economy and economic policy in 2013even if we don’t 
know exactly when and how policymakers will address the fiscal cliff. The economic recovery is still 
strong enough to avoid a recession on its own. The recovery, though, may face a changing set of threats 
as the lingering financial crisis in Europe seems to have slowed export growth and the economic 
uncertainty associated with the fiscal cliff may hold back business investments. 
Policymakers can once again intervene to strengthen the recovery, particularly by emphasizing 
infrastructure investments and support for U.S. exports. Ideological positions may encumber some 
policymakers and delay the economic policy compromise necessary to boost job growth that voters 
really want. A faster recovery is in the cards as long as the political will to compromise on taxes and 
spending exists in both parties, but it may take some time to arrive at such a compromise.  
A resilient recovery built on past targeted policy interventions 
The economy has sustained consistent growth for more than three years despite substantial obstacles. 
The primary obstacles to faster economic growth in the first three years of the recovery that started in 
3 
 
June 2009 were high household debt levels, shrinking state and local government spending, and a 
depressed housing market. These obstacles started to abate in the middle of 2012 but new obstacles 
emerged in their steadspecifically U.S. exports stalled amid the lingering European crisis and slower 
growth in China and India, and U.S. businesses held back on investments amid the growing uncertainty 
over how the president and Congress will address the looming tax increases and spending cuts.  
The first three years of the recovery: Moving against unprecedented headwinds 
The first three years of this economic recovery have been unique in modern economic history, dating 
back to World War II. There has never been a recovery without the housing market expanding 
substantially as well, for instance. But the housing market remained weak throughout the recovery. It 
declined for four quarters out of the first eight quarters of the recovery before growing again 
throughout the third year of the recovery. But real housing spending was only 10.3 percent greater in 
June 2009 than in June 2012, compared to an average increase of 41.2 percent in the first three years of 
previous recoveries.1 
There also has never been a recovery with state and local government spending shrinking for three 
years in a row. Yet real state and local government spending declined each quarter, except in the first 
one, from June 2009 to June 2012, so that real state and local government spending was 6.6 percent 
lower in June 2012 than three years earlier, compared to an average increase of 8.8 percent in prior 
recoveries.2 
And there has never been a recovery with households owing, on average, well more than 100 percent of 




Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Release Z.1 - Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
United States” (2012).  
The U.S. economy avoided slipping back into a recession despite these three major headwinds to 
economic growth. Targeted federal policies strengthened the private sector where possible.3 The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, for instance, and other subsequent legislation 
targeted the struggling manufacturing and construction sectors through infrastructure investment 
spending and money for green technologies. And the Making Work Pay tax credit, higher unemployment 
insurance and Social Security benefits that were included in the Recovery Act, and the subsequent 
payroll tax holiday for 2011 and 2012 boosted household after-tax income, particularly among middle-
class families where household debt burdens were highest.  
Key economic data show that public policies intended to strengthen the economic recovery had indeed 
the desired effect. Manufacturing production, for example, grew by an annualized rate of 5.6 percent 
from June 2009 to June 2012.4 Further, federal, state, and local governments spent more money on 
construction of highways, schools, railroads, hospitals, among other projects fueled in part by Recovery 
Act funds, such that their spending increased by an annual inflation-adjusted rate of 3 percent from June 
2009 to June 2012, which helped counter the decrease in private-sector construction spending.5 And 





















































































helping reduce the debt-to-after-tax-income ratio from 125.4 percent in June 2009 to 108.5 percent in 
June 20126—an unprecedented deleveraging (see Figure 1).   
Faster production, more construction spending on infrastructure projects, and higher after-tax incomes 
consequently helped to stabilize the economy and ultimately the U.S. labor market. Job growth returned 
in February 2010 and by June 2012 there were 2.6 million more jobs than in June 2009.7 And the 
unemployment rate fell from 9.5 percent in June 2009 to 8.2 percent in June 2012.8 The resurgence in 
manufacturing also allows firms to continue to build on past successes by better using their plant and 
equipment and their workers. This was reflected in strong U.S. export growth from June 2009 to June 
2012, averaging an annual growth rate of 7.9 percent, despite a strong dollar that made U.S. products 
more expensive in world markets.  
Now: Replacing old obstacles to growth with new ones 
The three major past obstacles—a struggling housing market, decreasing state and local government 
spending, and high household debt—are all becoming weaker hindrances to faster economic growth. 
This is especially true for the housing sector. Real residential housing investment, mainly spending on 
new homes, increased by 14.2 percent in the third quarter of 2012—the third double-digit increase in a 
year.9 And new home sales in September 2012 totaled a seasonally adjusted, annualized rate of 
389,000—the highest level since April 2010.10 Furthermore, state and local government spending in the 
third quarter of 2012 was essentially flat with an annual decline of only 0.4 percent—the smallest 
decrease since September 2009.11 One quarter may not make a trend but it may be a sign that the fiscal 
challenges for state and local governments are slowly coming to an end, especially since the spending 
decreases have become successively smaller in 2012.12 And finally, household debt levels will likely 
decrease further from their 108.5 percent level in June 2012—the lowest since September 2003—as 
banks continue to tighten lending.13  
But economic growth is held back by two new obstacles, specifically slower U.S. exports due to the 
lingering crisis in Europe and slower growth in China and India, and less business investment due in part 
to the economic uncertainty over what will happen to tax rates and federal spending as Congress and 
President Obama address the fiscal cliff. Real U.S. exports grew by an annual rate of 1.1 percent in the 
third quarter of 2012—their lowest growth rate since June 2009—and business investment actually fell 
at an annual rate of 2.2 percent in the third quarter of 2012—its largest decline since the end of 2009.14  
Slowing export growth follows less overseas demand for U.S. products. European economic growth has 
slowed in most major countries due to lingering financial and fiscal crises in several southern European 
countries. There is little that U.S. policymakers can do to directly impact the crisis in Europe. The policy 
lesson then for domestic policymakers is to strengthen the U.S. economy and the competitiveness of its 
manufacturing sector. Stronger domestic demand can offset the fallout from declining overseas 
demand, and a more competitive manufacturing sector will more easily overcome the obstacles posed 
by a strong dollar and slowing overseas growth.15  
The decline in business investment is in part attributable to the uncertainty over what will happen to the 
scheduled end-of-year changes in taxes and spending. The expiration of past tax cuts and the onset of 
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automatic spending cuts is the culmination of past policy decisions that Congress could and likely will 
alter in the coming weeks or months:16 
• The tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 under President George W. Bush as well as a series of 
smaller tax cuts enacted under President Obama in 2009 expire on January 1, 2013, potentially 
taking $281 billion out of the economy in 2013. 
• The expiration of the payroll tax cut that was in place for 2011 and 2012 will take another $115 
billion out of the economy, starting on January 1, 2013. 
• Other tax changes, such as the end of an expansion of the alternative minimum tax, expiring tax 
extenders and depreciation rules for businesses, and new taxes associated with the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, would take another $139 billion out of the 
economy, starting on January 1, 2013. 
• The expiration of extended unemployment insurance benefits would directly impact the 
economy to the tune of an estimated $34 billion, starting on January 1, 2013. 
• Changes to Medicare reimbursements for doctors would take another $14 billion out of the 
economy, and spending cuts totaling $78 billion start on January 2, 2013.  
The total bill for these tax and spending changes comes to $661 billion for 2013 alone.17  
The looming sizeable changes in taxes and spending creates enormous uncertainty for businesses and 
consumers in two ways. First, businesses and consumers don’t know which taxes will ultimately expire 
and which spending cuts will be enacted, even if people expect that President Obama and Congress will 
ultimately reach a deal to smooth the potential adverse effects on the economy.18 Second, the 
combination of tax increases and spending cuts, even if they are smaller than expected, could adversely 
impact economic growth, but without a political deal, businesses cannot estimate and thus cannot 
properly plan for the eventuality of a smaller economic impact. The Congressional Budget Office, for 
instance, expects that the economy would shrink by 0.5 percent in inflation-adjusted terms in 2013 if all 
provisions of the fiscal cliff go into effect, rather than grow by about 2 percent if many provisions are 
eliminated.19 There is no single estimate to show what would happen to the U.S. economy if the fiscal 
cliff is avoided since the exact impact depends on the provisions that are changed and the ones that are 
kept. The potential adverse effect on the U.S. economy consequently can swing widely. (see Table 1)20  
Policymakers can and likely will affect both sources of economic uncertainty. In the worst-case scenario, 
there will be no political deal to avoid the scheduled fiscal tightening. The scheduled tax increases and 
spending cuts will go into effect, thus creating certainty over both the fiscal and economic outlook. The 
removal of this uncertainty will likely be insufficient to stop the economy from going into recession. 
Alternatively, there will be a deal, although its timing is hard to predict. Any deal will also create 
certainty over the fiscal and economic outlook and thus lead to more investment and consumption than 
would be the case in a situation with less certainty. The remaining questions consequently are when 
President Obama and Congress will reach a deal; how large the fiscal tightening, if any, will be; and 
whether policymakers will set some money aside to address remaining and new obstacles—for example, 
by supporting manufacturing and construction businesses with more infrastructure spending.  
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Table 1: Possible growth effects of selected changes to the fiscal cliff 
  Difference 
against CBO 





CBO Baseline 0.00 1.30 
Eliminating the automatic enforcement procedures established by 
the Budget Control Act of 2011 for both discretionary and 
mandatory spending, maintaining Medicare’s payment rates for 
physicians’ services at the current level 
0.75 2.05 
Extending all expiring tax provisions other than the cut in the payroll 
tax and indexing the alternative minimum tax for inflation beginning 
in 2012 
1.50 2.80 
Doing both of the above (i.e., the Congressional Budget Office’s 
“alternative fiscal scenario”)  
2.25 3.55 
Extending all expiring tax provisions other than the cut in the payroll 
tax, indexing the alternative minimum tax for inflation—except for 
allowing the expiration of lower tax rates on income above $250,000 
for couples and $200,000 for single taxpayers 
1.25 2.55 
Extending both the current 2 percentage-point cut in the payroll tax 
and emergency unemployment benefits—extensions that are not 
assumed in the alternative fiscal scenario—would boost real GDP by 
about three-quarters of a percent by the end of 2013; making those 
changes along with making all of the changes in the Congressional 
Budget Office’s alternative fiscal scenario  
3.00 4.30 
Sources: All figures in percent. All figures reflect real GDP growth rates for 2013. Congressional Budget Office, “An 
Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022” (2012); Congressional Budget Office, 
“Economic Effects of Policies Contributing to Fiscal Tightening in 2013” (2012).  
 
Public opinion may point the way to a resolution 
It is virtually impossible to divine answers to the questions related to a possible resolution of the 
looming fiscal tightening. Policymakers, though, may take a look at public opinion polls to help them 
frame their decisions.  
There is no doubt that people take the looming federal budget deficits seriously, but addressing deficits 
generally ranks lower in people’s minds than job creation. In a USA Today/Gallup poll taken from 
November 9–12, 2012, for instance, 95 percent of respondents ranked “taking major steps to restore a 
strong economy and job market” as extremely/very important for President Obama to accomplish, 
compared to 72 percent who ranked “make major cuts in federal spending” and 70 percent who ranked 
“simplify the tax code to lower rates, eliminate deductions/loopholes” as extremely/very important.21 
A poll by the Mellman Group conducted on November 12, 2012, similarly found that 67 percent of 
respondents favored creating jobs to 29 percent who favored deficit reduction in response to the 
question “which would you rather have Congress and the President focus on: reducing the federal 
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budget deficit or creating jobs?”22 And Stan Greenberg at Democracy Corps found in a poll conducted 
November 6–7, 2012, that 51 percent of respondents in this poll  ranked creating jobs and getting the 
economy going as one of the three most important things to focus on, compared to 47 percent who 
mentioned deficit reduction—the two most-often-mentioned issues to focus on in this poll.23  
Little recent polling exists on specific measures to strengthen the economy. The polling data, though, 
suggest that people are looking for a balance between short-term help for the economy and the labor 
market and longer-term measures to reduce the federal deficits. People also seem to accept the notion 
of a balance between tax increases and spending reductions. It is thus possible that policymakers will 
strike a deal soon that balances these competing goals.  
Conclusion 
The economic recovery has shown tremendous resilience in the face of major obstacles in recent years. 
This was no accident. Past policy interventions that targeted middle-class income growth and promoted 
a faster recovery in construction and manufacturing achieved their goals of building a stronger recovery. 
Policymakers can and will intervene to stop the economy from going into another recession—that is, 
there will in all likelihood be a deal to avoid the most severe impact of the expected fiscal tightening in 
early 2013. Economic growth could then very well accelerate over the course of 2013 as major obstacles 
to faster growth, including the so-called fiscal cliff, slowly disappear.  
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